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Determinants of Banking System Fragility - A Regional Perspective 
ABSTRACT 
Banking systems are fragile not only within one country but also within and across regions. We 
study the role of regional banking system characteristics for regional banking system fragility. 
We find that regional banking system fragility reduces when banks in the region jointly hold 
more liquid assets, are better capitalized, and when regional banking systems are more 
competitive. For Asia and Latin-America, a greater presence of foreign banks also reduces 
regional banking fragility. We further investigate the possibility of contagion within and across 
regions. Within region banking contagion is important in all regions but it is substantially lower 
in the developed regions compared to emerging market regions. For cross-regional contagion, we 
find that the contagion effects of Europe and the US on Asia and Latin America are significantly 
higher compared to the effect of Asia and Latin America among themselves. Finally, the impact 
of cross-regional contagion is attenuated when the host region has a more liquid and more 
capitalized banking sector.  
JEL Classification Codes: G15, G20, G29 
Keywords: Banking system stability, cross-regional contagion, financial integration 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Banks often face shocks both on their asset and liability side. A shock that initially affects 
only a few institutions can become systemic and infect the larger local economy. The 
globalization of banking further implies that shocks affecting a particular bank or country now 
can affect not only the local real economy but also the financial system and real economy in 
other countries. Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), for example, show that shocks hitting 
Japanese banks generate supply side effects on the real economy in the US. Similarly, Puri, 
Steffen and Rocholl (2011) document the transmission of the U.S. financial crisis to the behavior 
of linked German savings banks in Germany.  
The current academic literature on financial fragility, however, has mainly focused on 
stability of individual banks or individual countries’ banking systems (see e.g., Allen et al. 
(2009) for a review) but has disregarded regional banking system fragility. In this paper we study 
the determinants of regional banking system fragility. The 2007-2009 financial crisis has shown 
that a nation with a fragile banking system may affect countries in the region through cross-
border linkages and common exposures, and raise concerns for regional banking system fragility. 
We study which banking characteristics in a region alleviate regional banking fragility and which 
regional banking characteristics help in attenuating the impact of cross-regional contagion. We 
refer to regional banking system fragility as a situation when countries’ banking stock indices in 
a region have jointly very low returns. Furthermore, banking fragility in one region may lead to 
contagion in other regions – cross-regional contagion. 
Prudently regulating the banking system is undoubtedly a major objective for financial 
regulators because of the enormous cost of banking system instability. Hoggarth, Reis and 
Saporta (2002) for example estimate fiscal costs incurred in the resolution of 24 banking crisis in 
the last two decades and find that the cumulative output losses incurred during crisis periods are 
15-20%, on average, of annual GDP. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the underlying 
causes of systemic banking crisis is a foremost challenge for a prudent financial regulator. In the 
extant academic literature ,  various imbalances that may lead to a banking crisis are studied (see 
De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) for a comprehensive survey on systemic risk). Admittedly, even 
though each banking crisis is unique, at the core they share similarities in the behavior of a 
number of economic variables and banking system characteristics. To address the core issues we 
need to focus on the behavior of the banking system as a whole because what may appear sound 4 
 
at the micro level may be quite fragile and flawed at the macro level (Hellwig (1994)). Acharya 
(2009) models systemic risk stemming from correlation of returns on assets held by banks. He 
argues that the limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank's 
failure on the health of other banks gives rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all 
banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. 
Regulatory mechanisms, such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are 
commonly based on a bank's own risk, fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can 
in fact accentuate systemic risk.  
Our approach analyzes which key regional banking system characteristics – liquidity, 
capitalization, concentration, diversification, and foreign bank presence – determine regional 
banking system fragility controlling for common macro factors. We are also interested in the 
extent of banking system contagion within region and across regions. We follow the 
methodology in Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003), and we study regional banking system fragility 
through joint occurrences of negative extreme returns in banking system indices of multiple 
countries in the region. The joint occurrences of negative extreme returns are called 
‘coexceedances’. A higher number of coexceedances is strongly associated with the timing of the 
financial crises that took place during our sample period (1994-2008).  This is reassuring as it 
suggests that our fragility measure proxies for periods of banking system stress.  
We study whether regional banking system characteristics determine regional banking 
system fragility (i.e. the number of banking systems having joint occurrences of extreme 
negative returns on a particular day) after controlling for common variables, in a multinomial 
logistics settings. We further study cross-regional contagion by evaluating the effect of 
coexceedances in one region on banking system fragility in other regions. We are particularly 
interested in which key regional banking system characteristics in the host region help to dampen 
the impact of contagion from the triggering region.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following dimensions. First, we 
investigate contagion in the banking sector across regions whereas the literature mainly deals 
with within-country contagion, cross-border contagion, or contagion across individual banks.  
Second, we assess the role of key regional banking system characteristics — liquidity, 
capitalization, concentration, diversification of banking activities, and the degree of foreign bank 
presence, in attenuating regional banking fragility. Third, we study cross-regional contagion and 5 
 
identify a host region’s banking characteristics that attenuate contagion stemming from other 
regions. Finally, we study four different regions – Asia, Latin America, US and Europe. This 
allows us to investigate contagion among developed and developing economies.  
We find that a region’s banking system characteristics play a significant role in 
explaining regional banking system fragility next to the effects of common macro factors. 
Among the banking system characteristics, higher liquidity reduces regional banking system 
fragility in all regions whereas higher capitalization reduces regional banking system fragility in 
all regions with the exception of Asia and Europe, where it has no effect. A possible explanation 
is that average capital ratios during the sample period were lower in Asia and Europe (5.3% and 
4.7% respectively), compared to Latin America and the US (8.7% and 7% respectively). Our 
results suggest therefore that increases in capital do have an effect in reducing bank fragility but 
only when capital levels are higher than a threshold of around 7%. Regarding the impact of 
banking competition, our findings are supportive of the competition-stability view in most 
regions as an increase in competition in the banking industry significantly reduces the probability 
of joint occurrences of extreme negative returns. We further find that a focus on traditional loan 
making activities increases the likelihood of a single country in the bottom tail, but there is no 
significant impact on joint occurrences of extreme negative returns in the region. Finally, for 
Asia and Latin-America, a greater presence of foreign banks also reduces regional banking 
fragility. We note that these results are robust to employing an alternative measure of 
coexceedances based on abnormal returns (i.e., return on the banking index minus the return on 
the market).
1  
We also find evidence for contagion in all regions. Within region contagion is higher in 
emerging market regions, compared to developed regions, and is stronger in Latin America than 
in Asia. For cross-regional contagion, we find that the contagion effects of Europe and the US on 
Asia and Latin America are significantly higher compared to the effect of Asia and Latin 
America among themselves. More specifically, in Asia, the contagion effect is higher when the 
triggering region is the US, whereas in Latin America, the effect from Europe and the US is 
almost identical.  
                                                 
1 The number of days that have the same number of coexceedances under both measures ranges from 63% to 95% 
depending on the region. 6 
 
Finally, we find that a higher level of aggregate liquidity and higher capital ratios in the 
host region attenuate significantly the contagion effects from other regions.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we discuss our 
empirical hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and variables used in the paper and provide 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 explains methodology and the use of multinomial logit model. 
Section 5 presents our results. Subsection 6 discusses a few robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2  DETERMINANTS OF REGIONAL BANKING SYSTEM FRAGILITY 
 
Regional banking system fragility is determined by economic fundamentals and key 
characteristics of the regional banking system. Following Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003), we 
include three common variables as a proxy for economic fundamentals, “regional conditional 
volatility”, changes in the exchange rate, and interest rates. We discuss those in the first 
subsection. In subsection 2, we motivate our regional banking system characteristics. These 
include banking system liquidity, capitalization, concentration, diversification, and the presence 
of foreign banks. Finally, in the last subsection, we discuss the impacts of cross-regional 
contagion. We briefly motivate each of our variables in the following subsections.  
2.1  REGIONAL MACRO FACTORS 
There is an extensive literature that explores the relationship between stock markets and 
common macro variables. A number of recent studies assert that stock market volatility should be 
negatively correlated with stock returns (e.g., Bekaert and Wu (2000), Whitelaw (2000), Wu 
(2001) and Brandt and Kang (2004) theoretically and empirically argue that increases in stock 
market volatility increase risk and decrease stock returns. According to this strand of literature, a 
higher conditional volatility corresponds to a higher probability of a declining market that has a 
negative impact on portfolio returns in general. In our analysis, we therefore expect that an 
increase in regional conditional stock market volatility results in a higher number of joint 
occurrences of extreme negative returns of banking indices. A second motivation to include 7 
 
stock market volatility is that it affects bank profitability through the increased likelihood of non-
performing loans because of the higher leverage during volatile stock markets (see e.g., Ho-Mou 
(2009) for details on the relationship between financial leverage and market volatility; and 
Ghosh (2005) for the relationship between financial leverage and banks’ non-performing loans).  
Banks are often exposed to different currencies. There is significant evidence that 
exchange rate risk exacerbates banking system fragility during crises (Kaminsky (1999), 
(Kaufman (2000), Hutchison and Glick (2000)). We therefore include the average of daily 
exchange rate changes of all countries in the region as an independent variable in our model to 
study its effect on the probability of coexceedances in banking stock indices. 
Banks typically borrow short-term and originate long-term loans leading to interest rate 
risk. In particular, an increase in interest rates deteriorates banks’ balance sheets as a higher 
interest rate to depositors in the short run cannot be compensated by higher rates on long-term 
loans or may lead to increased non-performing loans. Therefore, ceteris paribus, an increase in 
interest rates is likely to increase banking fragility (see e.g., Flannery and James (1984)). The 
interest rate further controls for the effect of business cycle variables including domestic 
inflationary pressures, increase in foreign interest rates, shift towards tight monetary policy and 
lax regulatory framework owing to financial liberalization (Galbis (1995)). We introduce the 
interest rate as a regional macro control variable in our model.  
2.2  REGIONAL BANKING SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
The structural characteristics of the region’s banking sector play a role in the fragility of 
the region’s banking sector. We now motivate why the following characteristics of the region’s 
banking system are important – liquidity, capitalization, concentration, diversification, and 
presence of foreign banks.  
2.2.1  Liquidity  
Banks provide liquidity to both depositors and lenders (see e.g., Kashyap, Rajan and 
Stein (2002) or Gatev and Strahan (2006)). Individual banks maintain liquidity in order to 
withstand “normal” liquidity withdrawals from their customers. When their individual liquidity 
holdings are insufficient, banks rely on the interbank market or turn to the central bank. Liquidity 
in the interbank market therefore serves as a first line of defense against liquidity shocks. From a 
macro perspective, banks should maintain adequate levels of liquidity such that they are able to 8 
 
absorb shocks to the banking system (see e.g., Cifuentes, Shin and Ferrucci (2005)). Allen and 
Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) consider the case where banks may face regional liquidity 
shocks stemming from consumers who are uncertain about where they will consume. A common 
implication is that greater regional banking system liquidity enhances the stability of the regional 
banking system. Further, a region’s aggregate banking system liquidity effectively mitigates 
coordination failures in the interbank market and ensures financial stability (Karas, Schoors and 
Lanine (2008)). We therefore include a region’s banking system liquidity in our analysis to 
investigate its impact on regional banking system fragility. 
2.2.2  Capitalization 
Ceteris paribus, a greater capitalized banking system is more stable because a higher 
capital base provides a cushion against insolvency. Prudential regulation in the past was designed 
at the level of the individual bank and therefore failed to incorporate the systemic risk from 
correlated portfolio positions in the banking system or from domino effects from interbank 
exposures.
2 We use the capital base of the region’s banking system instead of focusing on capital 
of each individual bank. Our motivation comes from Freixas et al. (2000) and Allen and Gale 
(2000) who argue that a better capitalized banking system helps in reducing possible contagion 
effects from individual bank failures in the same country or region. 
2.2.3  Concentration 
The relationship between the degree of banking competition and financial stability is 
complex (see e.g., Carletti and Hartmann (2003) for an overview). The “Competition-Fragility” 
theories - based on the idea of ‘charter/franchise value’ of the institutions, argue that more bank 
competition erodes market power, leading to more bank risk-taking. This attitude of bank owners 
increases fragility of the banking system (Marcus (1984); Keeley (1990); Demsetz, Saidenberg 
and Strahan (1996)). Alternatively, the “Competition-Stability” view suggests that more market 
power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk. The reasoning is that borrower moral 
hazard is exacerbated when banks charge higher loan rates to borrowers (e.g. Boyd and De 
Nicolo (2005)). Competition is good for financial stability because more competition leads to 
                                                 
2  Liu and Mello (2008) argue that fulfilling the capital requirements at individual bank level is not sufficient to 
prevent systemic crisis. They provide evidence from the recent financial 2007-2009 financial crisis, when financial 
institutions like Northern Rock, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers collapsed even though these institutions had 
capital ratios that appeared adequate before collapsing. 9 
 
lower interest rates, which in turn lead to lower probability of loan default, and hence safer 
banks. Furthermore, concentration results in few large financial institutions that possibly engage 
in more risky activities because they believe they are too-big-to-fail.   
Recent papers combine those two views. Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009) for 
example argue that these views need not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the 
effect of competition and market power on stability in banking. Even if market power in the loan 
market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks 
protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engage in other risk-mitigating 
techniques. Similarly, adequate policies – such as risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums – 
could mitigate any trade-off between competition and bank stability. Martinez-Miera and 
Repullo (2010) argue that there is a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of 
bank failure: the competition-stability view identified by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) tends to 
dominate in monopolistic markets whereas competition-fragility view dominates in competitive 
markets.  
The existing empirical work is mainly about competition in national banking systems and 
its impact on individual bank soundness or national banking system stability (see e.g., Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003), Cihák, Schaeck and Wolfe (2006), Boyd, De Nicoló and 
Jalal (2007), De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2007), Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), or Jiménez, 
Lopez and Saurina (2010)). We study competition in the region’s banking system and its impact 
on regional banking system fragility. We motivate this approach as follows: several banks are 
active across borders and therefore the region’s degree of competition may be a more relevant 
statistic than the national degree of competition (see also Liu, Molyneux and Wilson (2010)).   
2.2.4  Diversification 
Diversification of bank activities may improve or deteriorate banking stability. Financial 
conglomeration, for example, allows banks to move away from traditional commercial banking 
activities and offer a range of financial instruments according to their customers’ needs. Whether 
diversification in banking activities create or destroy shareholders’ value and leads to financial 
stability or not is an intriguing question addressed in many research studies; see e.g., Laeven and 
Levine (2007), van Lelyveld and Knot (2009), Schmid and Walter (2009), Stiroh (2006), Baele, 
De Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007). Laeven and Levine (2007) find evidence of a 
‘diversification discount’, that is, financial conglomerates have lower market value than would 10 
 
be the case if those conglomerates were broken down into financial intermediaries that specialize 
in the individual activities. More recently, De Jonghe (2010) finds that banking system fragility, 
measured through an increase in bank’s tail beta, aggravates when a bank engages in non-
traditional activities. Since interest income is less risky than other revenue streams, it is argued 
that specialization in traditional activities result in lower systemic banking risk. Wagner (2006) 
and Wagner (2010) theoretically argue that even though diversification may reduce risk of the 
individual bank, from the financial system’s point of view it may increase the likelihood of 
systemic crisis as diversifying banks become more similar. Therefore, a shock that previously 
affected only a small part of the financial system now affects a large portion of the system. Given 
all the arguments above, we test whether diversification in banking activities increases or 
decreases regional banking fragility.   
2.2.5  Foreign banks 
The presence of foreign banks in a region may impact the fragility of the regional 
banking system in different ways. On the one hand, for some regions like Asia and Latin 
America, a greater foreign bank presence may lead to greater banking efficiency and competition 
in the domestic financial systems. Claessens and Van Horen (2011) for example find that 
individual characteristics of the domestic banking system may influence the performance of 
foreign banks. Specifically, foreign banks tend to perform better when it is headquartered in a 
developed country and the regulation is relatively weak in the host country.  On the other hand, 
foreign banks may provide a channel for cross-border contagion when they transmit shocks from 
one region to another (e.g., Peek and Rosengren (2000) or Bruno and Shin (2011)).  
2.3  CROSS-REGIONAL CONTAGION 
The re-emergence of crises during the 1990s (Mexican Peso Devaluation of 1994, 1997 
Asian Crisis and 1998 Russian Crisis) already established the need for a better understanding of 
the mechanisms of cross-border contagion (Claessens and Forbes (2001)).  The recent 2007-2009 
financial crisis further endorses that cross-border contagion is a phenomenon that can include not 
only neighboring countries in the region but also countries across regions (i.e. cross-regional 
contagion). The contagion can be fundamentals-based (i.e. via trade or finance links) or ‘pure’ 
contagion, which arises when common shocks and all channels for potential interconnection are 
either not present or controlled for (Calvo and Reinhart (1996)).  11 
 
The recent literature has started to investigate cross-border contagion in banking systems 
and stock markets in general. In particular, some authors have simulated idiosyncratic shocks in 
one national banking system to all banking systems in the region to investigate regional and 
worldwide banking system stability. A shock can be transmitted via direct balance sheet 
interlinkages between financial systems. For example, Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) 
investigate contagion through direct cross-border linkages. They find that the failure of a banking 
system (hit by an exogenous default on foreign claims that are in excess of aggregate bank 
equity) can trigger domino effects in other countries that raise serious concerns for global 
financial stability.  
There are empirical studies that explore cross-border contagion through co-movement of 
asset prices and test whether a change in asset prices in country A has some effect on asset prices 
in country B, using a number of econometric techniques (Baig and Goldfajn (1999); Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002); Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003); Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2005)). Bae, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2003) explore cross-regional contagion in stock market indices with focus on 
Asia and Latin America. They find significant evidence for the propagation of large negative 
returns across regions. Latin America triggers more significant cross-regional contagion than 
Asia; and the US is largely insulated from contagion from Asia. Some recent studies that 
concentrate on bank level data, also find evidence for cross-border contagion through co-
movement of banking stocks (Gropp, Duca and Vesala (2009)). We also use co-movement of 
asset prices and follow the methodology of Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) to extend the previous 
work on cross-border banking contagion towards cross-regional contagion. We focus on cross-
regional banking contagion after controlling for common shocks and banking characteristics at 
the regional level. 
In this paper, we investigate contagion both within region and across regions. We define 
contagion within region as the portion of regional banking system fragility (joint occurrences of 
extreme negative returns) that is not explained by the banking system characteristics and the 
regional common variables. For contagion across regions, we include indicators of regional 
banking system fragility in other regions as an explicit independent variable in our model, to 
assess the impact of fragility in different triggering regions on the host region.  
 12 
 
3  DATA, DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
 
In our analysis we use countries’ banking indices from Datastream starting from July 1, 
1994 to December 31, 2008 (3784 daily observations). Datastream uses Industry Classification 
Benchmarks (ICB) for the construction of these indices. We include 10 Asian and 7 Latin 
American countries, following Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003). Moreover, we include the United 
States and Europe (as one entity) in our analysis to study the extent to which banking crisis in 
these regions affect banking system fragility in Asia and Latin America.  
<please insert table 1 here> 
Table 1 shows the number of banks included in the banking indices from each country. It 
also provides sample statistics including correlations for the full sample period. We find that the 
marginal daily return on banking indices varies across countries. The marginal daily return in the 
US is 0.041% and 0.035% in Europe. In Asia, China has the highest average daily return 
(0.089%), followed by Pakistan (0.073%) and India (0.072%). On the other hand, Indonesia has 
been the most volatile market in Asia with the highest daily return standard deviation i.e. 
3.322%. In Latin America, Mexico led with 0.095% average daily return followed by Venezuela 
(0.085%) and Brazil (0.081%). Mexico and Argentina are among the most volatile markets in 
Latin America with standard deviations of 2.342% and 2.371% respectively. 
Correlations among banking indices vary across countries. Within region we find that 
some countries exhibit higher correlations than others; for example, Thailand, Philippines and 
Malaysia have high correlations (averaged around 0.14) in Asia. Overall the daily returns on 
banking index in Asian countries have an average correlation coefficient of 0.10 among 
themselves compared to 0.13 in Latin America. Moreover, we find that the correlation of the 
average banking returns of Asian countries with Latin America, the US and Europe are 0.05, 
0.03 and 0.13 respectively. The low correlation coefficient may be due to difference in trading 
timings; therefore, we use previous trading day return in Latin America, the US and Europe and 
current day return in Asia. Results are shown in italics in the upper right matrix of table 1. We 
find that average correlation of daily return in Asian markets with the previous day’s daily return 
in the US becomes 0.14. There is a minor increase in case of Latin America (0.05 to 0.06), 13 
 
whereas average correlation declines from 0.13 to 0.12 in case of Europe (the trading timing 
overlap in Asia and Europe, such that contemporaneous correlations make more sense). 
3.1  EXCEEDANCES AND COEXCEEDANCES 
We follow the view that extremely low (negative) market returns on banking indices 
reflect fragility of the banking sector. To put things in a quantitative framework, we define an 
extreme event when the banking index return on that day lies below the 5th percentile of daily 
return distribution and refer to this as an exceedance of the return on the banking index. The 
distribution of the daily banking index return is directly observed from our dataset (3784 daily 
observations). From the distribution of 3784 daily observations of return on banking indices, we 
calculate 5th percentile value for each country and region and then use this value as a standard to 
decide whether a country or region on a particular day exceed or not.  Moreover, we refer to 
coexceedances as a phenomenon when the banking indices of more than 1 country in the same 
region exceed on the same day. In table 2, we report the number of days for 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 or 
more joint occurrences of extreme return (coexceedances) within a region on a particular day. 
We also indentify which countries “participate” in those extreme events and how often.  
<please insert table 2 here> 
As we are interested in banking system fragility, our focus is on joint occurrences of low 
extreme returns (negative coexceedances), but we also display the joint occurrences of high 
extreme returns (positive coexceedances) separately. We have found an asymmetry between 
negative and positive extreme returns distribution in Asia and Latin America. In our sample, we 
find that there are 2497 trading days when there is no negative extreme return compared to 2451 
trading days when there is no positive extreme return in Asia. Similarly, there are 908 and 943 
trading days when only one country witness extreme negative and positive returns in Asia 
respectively. In Latin America, there are 2832 and 2744 trading days of no negative and positive 
coexceedance respectively, whereas there are 719 and 829 trading days with one country in 
negative and positive tail respectively. The asymmetry in the distribution of extreme return is 
evident with 55 trading days when 4 or more countries in Asia are in bottom tail compared to 41 
trading days when 4 or more countries in top tail. The asymmetry is even more in Latin America 
where 40 trading days when 4 or more countries in bottom tail compared to 21 trading days in 
top tail. Thailand has been the most recurring participant of the group of 4 or more countries in 14 
 
bottom as well as top tail. In Latin America, Argentina and Brazil are the most recurring 
countries in the group of 4 or more countries in the bottom or top tail. Beside Argentina and 
Brazil, Mexico often included in extreme events. On the other hand, Pakistan appears least 
number of times in negative extreme events within Asia. Venezuela is the least recurring country 
in extreme events in Latin America. We also report the daily return on the day of extreme event 
(4 or more countries coexceed) for all countries in our sample. We find that, in Asia, Indonesia, 
Korea, Pakistan, Thailand and India have above average negative return during negative extreme 
events. In Latin America, Argentina and Mexico have high negative returns during negative 
extreme events.  
We also find that there is clustering of negative coexceedances in 1998 and 2008 for 
Asia, and in 1995, 1998 and 2008 in Latin America, when different financial crises hit both 
regions. This is shown in Figure 1, and indicates that increases in regional systemic risk are 
actually reflected in higher number of days with a high number of negative coexceedances. 
 
<please insert figure 1 here> 
As banks are more interconnected in international markets compared to firms in other 
sectors, we next investigate whether banking indices are more prone to contagion, i.e. a larger 
number of negative coexceedances, than general stock market indices.
3 To do this, we count the 
frequency of negative coexceedances in banking indices and total market indices; then we 
subtract the number of coexceedances in total market indices from the number of coexceedances 
in banking system indices for each daily observation in both Asia and Latin America. We find 
that there are 520 days in Asia, when coexceedances in total market indices are greater than 
coexceedance in banking system indices; whereas there are 595 days when the coexceedances in 
banking indices are greater than coexceedances in total market indices. Similarly, in Latin 
America, we find 459 days when coexceedances in total market indices are higher; compared to 
524 days when coexceedances in banking indices are higher. Therefore we can conclude that 
banking stocks tend to coexceed more than other stocks. 
                                                 
3 In our sample banking institutions represent 20-35 percent of the total market capitalization.  15 
 
3.2  REGIONAL MACRO FACTORS 
As we discussed in Section 2, stock market volatility is expected to have an influence on 
regional banking system fragility. To investigate this econometrically, we estimate regional stock 
market volatility through indices that are representative of the capitalization of stocks that 
foreign investors can hold. More specifically, we use the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
indices from Asia and Latin America, and the S&P 500 index for the United States and 
Datastream International Europe Index for Europe in order to examine stock market volatility in 
each of these regions. For each region, we estimate the conditional volatility of the respective 
stock indices using a GARCH (1, 1) model of the form: 
   σ , 
   α β  ε ,   
   β  σ ,   
      (1) 
using maximum likelihood, where σ , 
   represents the conditional variance of the stock market 
index in country c in period t, and ε represents stock market returns in that market. In the first 
column of Table 3, we report the mean and standard deviation of conditional volatility of all 
countries in the region as well as the regional conditional volatility over the entire sample period. 
Individual countries conditional volatility is calculated through their respective total market 
stock indices, whereas the regional conditional volatility is computed with IFC indices, S&P 500 
and Datastream International Europe Index as reported earlier. We find that Korea has the 
highest and Sri Lanka has the lowest conditional volatility in Asia. In Latin America, Venezuela 
has the highest and Chile the lowest conditional volatility. At the regional level, we find that the 
stock market in Latin America is more volatile with conditional volatility of 23.39 percent 
compared to 21.19 percent in Asia, 15.84 percent in the US and 15.03 percent in Europe.  
<please insert table 3 here> 
The second common factor that affects regional banking system fragility is the daily 
change in exchange rate. We calculate the daily change in exchange rate against US dollar for 
each country in Asia and Latin America. In the case of the US, we use a basket of four currencies 
(i.e. GBP, JPY, CHF and EUR) to evaluate exchange rate changes. For Europe, since EUR and 
GBP are the two major currencies, we take equal-weighted average of EUR and GBP exchange 16 
 
rates changes against USD.
4 We report mean and standard deviation of daily changes in 
exchange rates of individual countries and regions in the second column of table 3. We find that 
all currencies except Chinese Yuan in Asia and Latin America depreciated in our sample period. 
The most depreciated currency in Asia is the Pakistani Rupee (0.026% daily) and the Venezuelan 
Bolivar is the most depreciated currency (0.080% daily) in Latin America. We use an equal-
weighted average of the daily changes in exchange rate of all countries in the region to get the 
regional change in exchange rate on that particular day. We find that Asian currencies, on 
average, depreciated less compared to currencies in Latin America, whereas, the US dollar and 
European currencies are appreciated, on average, during the sample period.  
Finally, we explore the impact of the interest rate on regional banking system fragility. 
For the regional interest rate, we compute an equal-weighted average of 1-year interbank interest 
rate in countries within each region. We present the mean and standard deviation of interest rates 
of individual countries and region as the third column of table 3. We find a high degree of 
heterogeneity in interest rates across countries in Asia and Latin America. In Asia, the lowest 
interest rate is observed in Taiwan (3.938% on average) and the highest in Indonesia (13.361% 
on average). In Latin America, the interest rate is 0.498% in Chile and 21.488% in Argentina. At 
the regional level, we find that the average interest rate is higher in Latin America than in Asia, 
and that it is significantly lower in US and Europe with respect to the both Asia and Latin 
America. 
In terms of time series behavior, we find that the conditional volatility increases 
significantly in all regions during crisis periods (Asian crisis, dot com bubble and the 2007-9 
financial crisis), which is expected due to the turbulence in stock markets. The average daily 
change in exchange rate remains under 0.05 percent in all regions except during crises period in 
Asia (Asian crisis 1997) and Latin America (Argentinian crisis 2002). Lastly, even though 
interest rates decline in all regions, they are significantly higher in Latin America compared to 
other regions (it remains in double digit until 2003). Interest rates in Asia were also in double 
digit untill late 1990s, but they were lower than in Latin America. In the US and Europe, we find 
that interest rate averaged around 5 percent, with a particularly low interest-rate environment in 
                                                 
4 Since our sample starts from June 1994; therefore, we use country-weighted average of exchange rate against USD 
of euro currencies for daily observations prior to the introduction of the euro. 17 
 
the early 2000s. Moreover, we find interest rates hike in Asia and Latin America only in 
response to subprime crisis; whereas the US and Europe further lowered their interest rates.   
3.3  REGIONAL BANKING SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
Regional banking system fragility may hinge upon a region’s banking characteristics 
including liquidity, capitalization, concentration, diversification of bank’s activities and the 
degree of foreign bank presence. We evaluate the effect of these banking characteristics on 
regional banking system fragility using annual balance sheet data for banks in each individual 
country from Bankscope. These variables are available on an annual basis; therefore, we use the 
annual value of the preceding year for all daily observations of the current year. Moreover, the 
regional values are calculated by averaging individual country level data. We use the ratio of 
total banking assets of a country to the total banking assets of the region as the weight. This 
captures the relative size and strength of a country’s banking system in the region; therefore, the 
bigger the banking system of a country the more influence it would have at the regional level.   
<please insert table 4 here> 
Table 4 shows the mean and standard deviation for banking characteristics for each 
country as well as for the regions during the whole sample period. In order to gauge the effect of 
banking system liquidity we use a narrow definition of liquidity, which is the ratio of cash and 
cash equivalent assets to total assets. We call this variable liquidity hereafter. We find that the 
banking system in India and Pakistan are holding high cash reserves relative to total assets. The 
cash holdings of India and Pakistan are 12.55 percent and 11.56 percent of the total assets 
respectively compared to 2.8 percent on average in Asia. Similarly, in Latin America, Venezuela 
holds 10.6 percent of the total asset as cash or cash equivalent compared to a regional average of 
2.88 percent. At the regional level, Asia and US have the largest average liquidity ratios (2.8%) 
during the sample period, while Europe has the lowest(1.8%).   
Secondly, the ability of banking systems to absorb foreign shocks depends on the degree 
of capitalization of the banking system. Our measure of capital is total equity that includes 
common shares, retained earnings, reserves for general banking risks and statutory reserves, loss 
absorbing minority interests, net revaluation of AFS securities, FX reserves included in equity 
and revaluations other than securities deemed to be equity capital. We find that the banking 18 
 
systems in Asia, on average, maintain low capital to total assets ratio (5.3%), compared to Latin 
America (8.7%), and that Europe has on average lower capital ratios (4.7%) than the US (7%) . 
In order to measure competition in banking industry, we use the ratio of total assets of the 
biggest five banks to total assets of all banks (i.e. C5 measure) for each country in the region. We 
label it as concentration in our analysis. The regional measure of concentration is the weighted 
average of the individual country’s concentration measures in the region using banking system 
total assets as relative weights. We find that banking systems in Asia are, on average, relatively 
more concentrated than the ones in Latin America. Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan are among the 
most concentrated banking systems in Asia, whereas Peru, Venezuela and Chile are highly 
concentrated banking systems in Latin America. 
We also evaluate whether banking systems that are primarily involved in traditional loan-
making activities are more or less prone to regional banking system stability. In order to measure 
the extent to which banks are involved in traditional loan-making activities compared to non-
traditional activities, we calculate the ratio of net loans to total earning assets for each country 
and label it as loan ratio in our results. We find that net loans are about half of the total earning 
assets in almost all countries. Latin America has the lowest ratio (44%) with respect to all other 
regions.   
Finally, we explore the impact of the degree of foreign bank presence in Asia, Latin 
America, the US and Europe. We use the database of Claessens and Van Horen (2011) reporting 
the direct ownership of foreigners in the domestic financial system. This dataset includes 5377 
banks active at least one year in 137 countries during the period 1995-2009, and encompasses 
commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, and bank holding companies. Based on 
direct ownership, the database classifies a bank as foreign bank if 50 percent or more of its 
shares are owned by foreigner for each year. All countries in our sample are included in the 
database except for Taiwan. Moreover, the database reports zero presence of foreign banks in Sri 
Lanka throughout the sample period. Within Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia have higher presence 
of foreign banks in the domestic financial systems. In general, the database also provides 
evidence for highest degree of foreign ownership in Latin America and lowest in Asia among the 
four regions we consider. Specifically, foreign ownership is about half of the domestic banking 
systems in Peru, Mexico and Chile during the sample period, on average.  19 
 
In terms of time series behavior, during our sample period we observe a mixed trend in 
liquidity across regions. In particular, we find a declining trend in the US and Asia, stable in 
Europe and volatile in Latin America. Towards the end of our sample period, liquidity tends 
towards 2 percent (cash as percentage of total assets) in all regions except for Latin America 
(around 3 percent). Capitalization has always been higher in Latin America (around 8 – 10 
percent), followed by the US (6 – 7 percent), Asia (5 percent) and Europe (4 – 5 percent). 
Concentration is typically higher in underdeveloped regions compared to developed regions. We 
find that top-5 banks in Asia and Latin America typically hold 60 – 80 percent of total assets of 
the banking system (though ratio declines during our sample period). On the other hand, top-5 
banks in the US and Europe hold around 15 percent and 10 percent of total assets respectively. 
Regarding diversification, there is a declining trend in traditional banking activities (loan 
business). The data reveal that there is an increasing trend in foreign ownership in all regions 
over time. The percentage of foreign banks among total banks has increased from 11 percent to 
24 percent in Asia; from 27 percent to 40 percent in Latin America; from 15 percent to 32 
percent in the US; and from 28 percent to 39 percent in Europe. 
4  METHODOLOGY 
The central question in the financial contagion literature is whether financial markets 
become more interdependent during a financial crisis. Formally, financial contagion occurs when 
a shock to one country (or a group of countries) results in the propagation of the shock to a wide 
range of markets and countries in a way that is hard to explain only on the basis of changes in 
fundamentals. During the nineties, researchers primarily investigated whether cross-market 
correlation increased significantly during financial crisis (Bertero and Mayer (1990), King and 
Wadhwani (1990), Calvo and Reinhart (1996), Baig and Goldfajn (1999)). Boyer, Gibson and 
Loretan (1999) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) challenge the approach of contagion based on 
structural shifts in correlation. They argue that the estimated correlation coefficient between the 
realized extreme values of two random variables will likely suggest structural change, even if the 
true data generation process has constant correlation. They also point out the biases in tests of 
changes in correlation that do not take into account conditional heteroskedasticity. This 
motivated researchers to study contagion as a nonlinear phenomenon and introduce new 
techniques such as markov switching models (Ramchand and Susmel (1998) and Ang and 20 
 
Bekaert (2002)); extreme value theory (Longin and Solnik (2001) and Hartmann, Straetmans and 
Vries (2004)); and multinomial logistics model (Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003)).  
We follow the approach in Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and use a multinomial logistic 
model to assess how various banking systems are affected simultaneously following an external 
shock. The dependent variable in our model is the number of coexceedances in one region (the 
number of banking systems simultaneously in the tail) on a given day. The explanatory variables 
of our base model are macro shocks and banking characteristics. We also use the number of 
coexceedances in other regions (to capture cross-regional contagion effect) as an explanatory 
variable in an extended model. The general multinomial logistics can be illustrated as:  
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where   is the vector of covariates and    the vector of coefficients associated with the 
covariates,     
    is a logistic distribution and   is the number of categories in the multinomial 
model. The model is estimated using maximum log-likelihood function for a sample of   
observations as follows: 
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where     is an indicator variable whose value is equal to 1 if the     observation falls     
category and 0 otherwise.  
In our model there are five categories, i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 or more banking systems 
coexceed in a region. Following the convention we define category 0 (i.e. no banking system 
exceed on a given day) as the base category and all coefficients are estimated relative to this base 
category. Therefore, for each variable introduced in the model, we need to estimate four 
parameters. 
While we use a multinomial logistic model for Asia and Latin America, we use a logit 
model for US where the dependent variable is one if the US banking index is in the tail on a 
given day, 0 otherwise. For comparability purposes with the US, we use the same methodology 
for Europe. 21 
 
5  RESULTS 
We evaluate the state of banking system fragility in a region through the number of 
coexceedances in that region. A higher number of coexceedances (i.e. joint occurrences of 
extreme negative returns in banking indices) reflects more banking system fragility. In Section 3 
we report the number of coexceedances in Asia and Latin America. We now assess how banking 
system characteristics and macro factors affect the occurrence of such coexceedances. For 
comparison purposes, we also report results for the occurrence of exceedances for US and 
Europe.
5  We also explore the extent of contagion within region and across regions.  
 
<please insert table 5 here> 
 
Table 5 provides estimation results of the number of coexceedances within a region with 
macro control covariates using a multinomial logistic model for Asia and Latin America, and a 
logit model for US and Europe. Panel A provides estimates for Asia and Panel B shows results 
for Latin America. In the first column of each panel we report the number of negative 
coexceedances and relative frequencies. Since there are no covariates, the relative frequencies 
represent the probabilities of the respective outcomes. We find that during our sample period 
there is a probability of 65.99% that no Asian country has an extreme negative return on a given 
day, whereas the extreme event when 4 or more countries coexceed has a probability of 1.45%.  
Latin America, where negative extreme returns are relatively fewer, has slightly higher 
probability of no exceedances (i.e. 74.84%) and relatively lower probability of 4 or more 
coexceedances (i.e. 1.06%). We should be cautious with comparing the number of 
coexceedances in Asia and Latin America as the number of countries included in our analysis is 




5.1  EFFECT OF REGIONAL MACRO FACTORS 
 
                                                 
5 We treat Europe in the same way as the US. Therefore we use a logit model where the dependent variable is 1 if 
the European banking index is in the lower tail, zero otherwise.   
6 For US and Europe the frequencies simply reflect our methodology: the dependent variable takes a value of one 
when the banking index return on that day lies below the 5th percentile of daily return distribution.   22 
 
A higher number of coexceedances reflects banking system fragility. In this section we 
evaluate whether macro regional factors are important in explaining banking system fragility. 
Table 5 shows that an increase in the conditional volatility significantly increases the probability 
of all exceedances in all regions. For example in Asia, a one standard deviation increase in 
conditional volatility (see Table 3 for the magnitude of standard deviation) increases the 
probability of one exceedance by 0.048 and the probability of four or more coexceedances by 
0.007. In relative terms the economic effect is larger for four or more coexceedances as the 
frequency for 1 exceedance is 66% and the one for four or more coexceedances is 1.5%. All the 
partial derivatives are significant at 1% level and pseudo-R
2 is 6.58%. Similarly, in Latin 
America, one standard deviation increase in conditional volatility increase the probability of 1 
exceedance by 0.025 and the probability of four or more coexceedances by 0.004 (compared to a 
frequency for 1 exceedance of 74.8% and for four or more coexceedances of 1.1%). All marginal 
probabilities are significant at 1% level and pseudo-R
2 is 5.55%. For US and Europe we also find 
that conditional volatility increases the probability that the banking index will be in the lower 
tail. 
Exchange rate fluctuations and monetary policy conditions, reflected in the interest rate 
level, are crucial elements for banking system fragility. We test the hypothesis that the fall in 
domestic currencies and higher interest rate level on average, lead to more coexceedances in the 
region. The estimates are shown in Table 5. We find that currency depreciation aggravates 
banking system fragility in all regions. Specifically, we find that a 1 standard deviation fall in 
domestic currency value increases the probability of 1 exceedance by 0.018 and 0.025 in Asia 
and Latin America respectively. For the extreme event of four or more coexceedances, a 1 
standard deviation increase in the average exchange rate in the region increases the probability 
by 0.003 and 0.001 in Asia and Latin America respectively.  Similarly to conditional volatility, 
relative to the events frequencies, the economic effect is larger for four or more coexceedances.  
Also, tight monetary policy in the region tends to deteriorate banks’ balance sheets. 
Therefore, we expect that higher level of interest rates increases the probability of joint 
occurrences of negative extreme returns in banking indices. Our results are in line with our 
expectations in Asia and Latin America. In terms of economic magnitude, we find that 1 
standard deviation increase in interest rate level increases the probability of 1 exceedance by 
0.032 and 0.027 in Asia and Latin America respectively. In the case of four or more 23 
 
coexceedances, the increase in the probability is 0.004 and 0.001 in Asia and Latin America 
respectively.  
We also report the results for US and Europe, where we focus on the probability that the 
banking index is in the lower tail. As well as conditional volatility, depreciation of the domestic 
currency is also a significant determinant. However, interest rates do not play any role for US 
and Europe. The explanation may lie in the fact that interest rates have been at least half in US 
and Europe compared to emerging markets for most of the sample period (see Table 3), 
indicating that only at high levels of interest rates, further interest rate hikes affect banking 
fragility.  
In sum, we find that an increase in regional conditional stock market volatility, and a fall 
in domestic currencies increase banking system fragility in all regions, while a rise in interest 
rate levels significantly increase banking system fragility in Asia and Latin America only. 
Compared to the effect of our explanatory variables on total market indices as reported in Bae et 
al. (2003), we find that conditional volatility and exchange rate changes play a similar role.
7 
However, our results uncover an important difference with Bae et al. (2003). Interest rate 
changes are only statistically significant (and economically relevant) when analyzing banking 
fragility. They do not seem to affect fragility reflected in the general stock market index.   
5.2  EFFECT OF REGIONAL BANKING SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
The central question of this paper is whether the regional banking system characteristics 
matter in safeguarding banking system stability. In particular, we assess the role of banking 
system liquidity, capitalization, concentration, diversification in banking activities and presence 
of foreign banks. We build proxies for these characteristics using information obtained from 
banks’ balance sheets on an annual basis and from the database of Claessens and Van Horen 
(2011) in the case of foreign banks. As the frequency of our dependent variable is daily, we 
repeat the values of banking characteristics of the preceding year for all daily observations in the 
current year. We first add these regional banking system characteristics to the regression model 
of Section 5.1 one by one, as correlation among them may introduce multicollinearity problems. 
                                                 
7 We also compute the response of probability measures to the full range of values of independent variables (instead 
of focusing on the average value, as is the case in the marginal effects reported in the Tables). We produce 
coexceedances response curves which give a more complete picture, as probabilities are not linear functions of the 
explanatory variables. Our response curves are very similar to the ones in Bae et al. (2003).  Therefore we choose 
not to report them.  24 
 
Table 6 shows these results in Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 (i.e., one for each banking characteristic). 
We also report Model 6 that includes all banking explanatory variables.   
 
<please insert table 6 here> 
 
5.2.1  Liquidity 
In Section 2.2 we have argued that banking system liquidity serves as a buffer against 
liquidity shocks. A reasonable level of aggregate banking system liquidity is important for 
individual banks to get funds from the market without paying extraordinary premiums. This also 
discourages parking of funds for short-term benefits and improves market participants’ reliance 
on interbank activities. As a result this improves the efficiency of the interbank market at the 
country and regional level, thus reduces the chances of coexceedances. We test this hypothesis 
by investigating whether regional liquidity significantly affects the probability of joint 
occurrences of extreme negative returns. We use a narrow definition of liquidity that includes 
cash and cash equivalent as a ratio of total assets, and label it as liquidity.   
We find that a higher liquidity significantly reduces the probability of coexceedances in 
all regions. In the case of Asia, Model 1 shows that the effect is statistically significant for all  
coexceedances. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in liquidity reduces the 
probability of 2 coexceedances by 0.011 and the probability of 3 coexceedances by 0.004. For 
Latin America a one standard deviation increase in liquidity decreases the probability of 2 
coexceedances by 0.011 and the probability of 3 coexceedances by 0.003. Moreover, Model 1 
shows that including liquidity, raises the pseudo-R
2 from 6.5% and 5.5% (Table 5) to 8% and 7% 
(Model 1, Table 6) in Asia and Latin America respectively. Liquidity also decreases significantly 
the probability of being in the tail both for US and Europe. 
We also check the robustness of our results, employing a broader definition of liquid 
assets that includes not only cash and cash equivalents, but also listed securities, treasury bills, 
other bills, bonds and equity investments. We report these results in Section 6. 
5.2.2  Capitalization  
Bank capital provides a cushion against insolvency at the individual bank level. But from 
a macro perspective, the capital adequacy regulations for individual banks fail to incorporate the 
systemic risk from correlated portfolio positions in the banking system, and potential domino 25 
 
effects as a consequence of interbank exposures (see e.g., Liu and Mello (2008)). With this 
notion we investigate whether regions with a higher aggregate degree of bank capital exhibit less 
banking system fragility. We use the total equity of the region-wide banking system instead of 
focusing on bank capital for each bank. We label it as capitalization in our analysis. The results 
are reported in Model 2 and Model 6 in Table 6. For Asia, capitalization is not a significant 
determinant of financial fragility. For Latin America, a higher capitalization significantly 
decreases the likelihood of almost all categories of coexceedances in Model 2. However in 
Model 6 we find a positive significant effect for 2 and 3 coexceedances.  But we should mention 
here that capitalization is strongly correlated with concentration in Latin America (almost -0.70), 
so the results in Model 6 may be misleading as a consequence of high multicollinearity.  
  We also find mixed evidence for US and Europe. While capitalization reduces the 
likelihood of being in the tail for the US banking system, it has no effect for Europe.  However, 
we note that average capital ratios during the sample period were lower in Asia and Europe 
(5.3% and 4.7% respectively), compared to Latin America and the US (8.7% and 7% 
respectively). Our results suggest therefore that increases in capital do have an effect in reducing 
bank fragility but only when capital levels are higher than a threshold of around 7%. 
5.2.3  Concentration  
The literature on the effect of banking competition on banking system stability is 
inconclusive. As discussed in Subsection 2.2, two views exist, the competition-fragility view and 
the competition-stability view. We gauge competition in the banking industry through the C5 
measure of the level of concentration, which is the ratio of total assets of the largest five banks to 
total assets of all banks. We label it as concentration in our analysis. The estimates are shown in 
Model 3 and Model 6 in Table 6.  
We find that a higher level of concentration in the banking industry significantly 
increases the probability of 1 and 2 coexceedances in Asia, and the probability of 1, 2 and 4 
coexceedances in Latin America. Specifically, the estimates of Model 3 indicate that a 1 standard 
deviation increase in concentration raises the probability of 1 exceedance by 0.041 in Asia, and 
by 0.043 in Latin America. Less competition also increases the probability that the US and 
Europe will experience very low returns in their banking index.  Our evidence therefore seems to 
support the competition-stability view. However, it may still be consistent with Martinez-Miera 
and Repullo (2010) U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure. 26 
 
They argue that the competition-stability view identified by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) tends to 
dominate in monopolistic markets; whereas competition-fragility view dominates in competitive 
markets. The monopolistic market structure in Asia and Latin America (the five largest banks in 
the majority of the countries in Asia and Latin America hold 60 percent of total assets of the 
banking system), may require increased competition for banking system stability as predicted in 
their model. We may therefore be unable to identify the upward leg of the U-shaped relationship.   
 
5.2.4   Diversification  
Recent empirical  research provides  evidence that banking system stability is more 
vulnerable when banks engage in non-traditional activities in addition to their core commercial 
banking activities, both for US and Europe (De Jonghe (2010), Stiroh (2004)). Noninterest   
income, particularly trading income, is quite volatile  and  the  correlation  between  net  interest  
income  and noninterest income rises as product lines blur and banks increasingly substitute  
nontraditional sources of income for interest income. This means that the banking industry may 
not realize the reduction in volatility and risk that some expect (Stiroh (2004)). Therefore, it is 
argued that specialization in traditional activities results in lower systemic banking risk. Also 
Wagner (2006) provides a model where diversification in activities is unable to reduce systemic 
risk. In his framework, bank diversification reduces risk at the individual institution level, but 
from the financial system’s point of view, it just reallocates risks among institutions within the 
financial system and tends to expose each institution to the same external shock. 
We use the ratio of loans to total earning assets as a proxy for banks’ focus on traditional 
loan-making activities. We label it as loan ratio in our analysis.  Model 4 and Model 6 in Table 6 
report the effect of the regional level of concentration in traditional activities on the joint 
occurrences of extreme negative returns in the region. The results are not conclusive. For Asia, 
we do not find a consistent effect across Model 4 and 6. For Europe we do not find an effect. 
Finally for Latin America and US, there is some evidence for an increase in the probability of 
being in the lower tail when the loan ratio increases, a result that is different from the evidence 
for Europe in De Jonghe (2010) and for the US in Stiroh (2004).   
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5.2.5  Foreign banks 
The results on foreign banks are reported in Model 5 and Model 6 in Table 6. We find 
that a larger presence of foreign banks decreases the likelihood of coexceedances both for Asia 
and Latin America. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in foreign banks reduces the 
probability of 2 coexceedances by 0.014 in Asia and by 0.009 in Latin America. On the contrary, 
in the case of the US, a larger presence of foreign banks increases the likelihood of being in the 
low tail. We find no effect for Europe. 
 
<please insert figure 2 here> 
 
Finally, Figure 2 reports the coexceedances response curves corresponding to each of the 
banking system characteristics for Asia and Latin America. These graphs show the response of 
the probability measures for the full range of values of each banking characteristic, instead of 
focusing on the average value as is the case in the marginal probabilities reported in the Tables 5 
and 6. On the left side of Figure 2 we report the curves for Asia and on the right side the ones for 
Latin America. Consistent with our previous analysis, the response curves show that liquidity 
reduces the probability of coexceedances over the entire range of values in Asia and Latin 
America, though the effect seems more accentuated for Asia. In the case of capitalization, the 
curve is flat for Asia, whereas for Latin America it shows that more capital reduces the 
probability of coexceedances. As explained above, this seems to be due to the higher average 
capital ratios in Latin America compared to Asia. In the case of concentration, the effect is 
stronger for Latin America, but in both cases it implies that higher levels of concentration lead to 
increases in the probability of coexceedances. Finally, the response curves also show that foreign 
banks reduce the probability of coexceedances in Asia and Latin America. 
 
5.3  CONTAGION WITHIN REGION AND ACROSS REGIONS 
 
We now investigate whether there is any evidence for contagion within region and across 
regions. We define contagion within region as the portion of regional banking system fragility 
(joint occurrences of extreme negative returns) that is not explained by the region’s banking 28 
 
system characteristics and regional macro variables. In the case of cross-regional contagion, we 
capture its impact by including the number of coexceedances in the triggering region as an 
explanatory variable, while controlling for macro factors and banking characteristics in the host 
region.  In all models, when the triggering region is Asia or Latin America we use the number of 
coexceedances as explanatory variable, and when the triggering region is US (or Europe) we use 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the US (or European) banking index was in the tail, 0 otherwise.  
In Table 6, we reported the McFadden pseudo-R
2 with our estimations for the effect of 
banking system characteristics and macro factors on banking system fragility, which is around 
8% in Asia and 7% in Latin America. This shows that there is a considerable portion of joint 
occurrences of extreme negative return that is not explained by banking characteristics and 
common macro factors together. These numbers indicate that contagion within regions is 
stronger in Latin America than in Asia. This evidence is similar to the one for within region 
contagion reflected in the general stock market reported in Bae et al. (2003). However an 
important difference from Bae et al. (2003) is that within region banking fragility, is substantially 
lower in US and Europe (pseudo-R
2 are around 14%) compared to the emerging market regions.
8  
 
<please insert table 7 here> 
 
In Table 7 we report results of cross-regional contagion for Asia, Latin America, US and 
Europe. We add to Model 5 in Table 6, three measures of financial fragility in three triggering 
regions as explanatory variables. To make the test stronger we also add new control variables: 
the conditional volatility of the triggering regions. If the coefficients of the financial fragility 
variables of the triggering regions are positive and significant after controlling for the host 
region’s banking system characteristics, common macro factors, and the conditional volatility of 
the triggering regions, then we interpret this as the evidence of contagion from that particular 
triggering region. Following Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003), we use 1 day lag for the US and 
Latin American fragility measures when explaining contagion to Asia. For contagion to all other 
regions fragility measures from triggering regions correspond to the preceding trading session on 
the same day. We note that when the triggering region is Asia or Latin America, the financial 
fragility variable is a categorical variable that takes 5 possible values: 0 exceedance, 1 
                                                 
8 Note that this is also the case in Table 5 when we only control for macro factors.  29 
 
exceedance, 2 coexceedances, 3 coexceedances, and 4 or more. On the other hand, when the 
triggering region is US or Europe the financial fragility variable is a dummy variable that takes 
value one on those days when the respective banking index is in the lower tail, zero otherwise.  
In the case of Asia (Panel A), contagion triggered from the US is significant for all 
number of coexceedances and the marginal effects are almost always higher than when 
contagion is triggered from Europe. The economic impact of contagion from Latin America does 
not seem to be very important for Asia. In Panel B we report the results for Latin America. In 
this case, cross-regional contagion from the three other regions is statistically significant. 
However, the economic impact is low in the case of contagion from Asia compared to the US 
and Europe, probably due to closer geographic and economic ties of Latin America with the US 
and Europe.   
Finally, Panel C and D, show that while Europe is affected by all three regions, the US is 
only affected by Latin America and Europe.     
5.4  CAN  REGIONAL  BANKING  SYSTEM  CHARACTERISTICS  REDUCE  CONTAGION 
FROM OTHER REGIONS? 
 
Another interesting issue to investigate is whether the regional banking characteristics in 
the host region have any role in affecting the magnitude of contagion from other regions. We 
specifically study whether the level of liquidity, capitalization, concentration and diversification 
of the host region attenuate or exacerbate the effect of cross-regional contagion. We expect that 
higher liquidity and capitalization provide better resilience against cross-regional contagion; 
whereas the effect of diversification in banking activities, competition in the banking industry, 
and the presence of foreign banks on cross-regional contagion is ambiguous.  
In order to test these effects econometrically, we simplify our model for Asia and Latin 
America by using a logit specification with a dependent variable that takes the value of one when 
2 or more coexceedances occur in the host region,  zero otherwise. For US and Europe we use 
the same model as before.
9 We add to the explanatory variables in Model 5 in Table 7, three 
interaction terms of a banking characteristic with the three cross-regional contagion variables. 
                                                 
9 For US and Europe we use a logit model where the dependent variable is one if the US (Europe) banking index is 
in the lower tail, zero otherwise.  30 
 
We do this separately for each banking characteristic, and for each of the four regions. We report 
the results in Table 8. 
<please insert table 8 here> 
 
The measurement of the interaction effect in nonlinear models is not straightforward. Ai 
and Norton (2003) present a method to correctly calculate the magnitude and standard errors of 
interaction terms in nonlinear models. We note that the magnitude and statistical significance of 
the interaction effect varies with the values of the covariates. In fact, the value of the interaction 
term can even change sign for different data points.  In Table 8 we report the average interaction 
effect from the Ai and Norton methodology (2003) and its statistical significance. Moreover, for 
the regions where the average effect is significant for liquidity and capitalization we also show 
the Norton and Ai (2003) graphs in Figure 3. These graphs show the values of the interaction 
term for all data points. The continuous line is the marginal effect of the interaction term 
computed by the standard procedure; whereas the dots show the correct interaction effect. The 
statistical significance of the interaction effect is shown in the adjacent graph. The interaction 
effect is statistically significant whenever the z-value lies above or below the confidence interval 
lines. 
 
<please insert Figure 3 here> 
Table 8 shows that whenever the average interaction terms of the host region liquidity 
and capitalization are significant, they always present a negative sign, suggesting that they are 
important in attenuating the contagion effect from other regions. For concentration, the signs 
differ across regions and for the loan ratio the interaction terms are rarely significant. For foreign 
bank, the signs differ across regions. These different effects could depend on the origin of the 
foreign banks, as they may help to reduce the contagion from other regions, only as long as they 
are not themselves headquartered in the triggering regions. Unfortunately, we do not have data 
on the headquarters location of the foreign banks to test this conjecture.  
Specifically, liquidity in Asia attenuates significantly the risk of contagion from Latin 
America, liquidity in Latin America reduces contagion effects from the US, and liquidity in 
Europe helps to reduce contagion from Latin America. Capitalization is also an important 
attenuating factor. In Latin America, it reduces the impact of contagion from the US, and in 31 
 
Europe it attenuates contagion from both Asia and Latin America. Figure 3 shows that in all of 
these cases, the interaction term is negative and significant for most of the data points.  We 
should also note that in other cases where the average liquidity interaction term or the 
capitalization interaction term is not significant, there are still a fraction of the data points for 
which they play a significant role in reducing cross-regional contagion.  
 
6  ROBUSTNESS 
In this section we analyze the robustness of earlier analysis using alternative indicators 
for banking characteristics and alternative model specifications for fragility. We do not report 
regression results however.  
First, as already announced in Section 5, we also employ a broader measure of liquidity 
including not only cash and cash equivalents, but also listed securities, treasury bills, other bills, 
bonds and equity investments. Our (unreported) results on this broader liquidity measure are very 
much in line with those of our narrower definition.  
Second, we investigate the robustness of our findings to using (i) alternative model 
specifications and (ii) employing abnormal bank stock index returns to compute our 
coexeedances. We first discuss the robustness when employing a probit model. In our main 
analysis we capture banking system fragility through the number of coexceedances in the region 
on a particular day. We have five categories that are 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 or more; which represents 
the number of countries having joint extreme negative returns on that day. Higher number of 
coexceedances is thus referred to more fragile regional banking system. Due to the nature of our 
dependent variable we use multinomial logistics model. We also consider a simpler approach 
using a probit model where the binary variable has value 1 (representing regional banking 
fragility) when 2 or more countries coexceed in the region, else 0 (representing stability in 
regional banking system). We find that all common variables and banking characteristics 
significantly affect the probability of banking system fragility in the region. We find that 
conditional stock market volatility, currency depreciation, and increase in interest rate level 
increase the probability of regional banking system fragility in Asia and Latin America. 
Similarly, we find that the increase in liquidity and competition reduces the probability of 
regional banking system fragility in both regions; whereas capitalization diminishes the 32 
 
probability of regional banking system fragility in Latin America only. Diversification in 
banking activities fails to affect the probability of banking system fragility in any region. We 
also investigate the cross-regional contagion and once again we find that both Asia and Latin 
America are affected significantly by cross-regional contagion from all other regions. The 
economic magnitude of cross-regional contagion effect from Europe is the highest, followed by 
the contagion effect from the US in both Asia and Latin America.  
As a second exercise, we compute the coexceedances based upon the abnormal returns of 
the banking index relative to the stock market index, i.e., banking index return on day t in 
country i – stock market index return on day t in country i. An exceedance takes place when this 
abnormal return is in the left tail and coexeedances happen when on the same day several 
countries have abnormal returns which are in the left tail. Abnormal returns could be a more 
appropriate proxy of fragility to the extent they capture movements that are specific to banking 
returns which may be of greater interest for financial stability. We begin by comparing the 
proportion of days on which the number of coexeedances is the same under both measures. We 
find that in Asia, 2376 out of 3784 trading days (63%) have the same number of coexceedances 
under both measures. In Latin America, the share is higher: 2684 out of 3784 trading days (71%) 
have the same number of coexceedances under both measures. For the US and Europe, the 
exceedances under both measures overlap in about 95% of trading days. We replicate Tables 5 
and 6. The results are mostly similar to the ones reported in the main text. The macro variables 
remain significant, but now also the interest rate becomes significant in explaining exceedances 
in Europe. Greater liquidity reduces the likelihood of coexceedances with the exception of 
Europe where it is insignificant. A more capitalized banking system reduces coexceedances but 
is not significant for the US. A more concentrated banking system leads to more coexceedances 
and is now also significant in explaining three coexceedances for Asia and Latin America. The 
results for the loan ratio and degree of foreign banks are similar to the ones of our main model, 
but are in general now also significant in explaining a higher number of coexceedances. 
Finally, we check robustness with respect to our measure of cross-regional contagion. In 
our main analysis, we follow Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and use the number of 
coexceedances in triggering region as contagion indicator. This however differs across regions 
since the regions include a different number of countries. To enhance comparability across the 
four regions, we construct a binary cross-regional contagion variable for Asia and Latin 33 
 
America, whose value is 1 when the daily regional banking index return lies below 5th percentile 
on a particular day. Our main results are robust to using this alternative cross-regional contagion 
variable. 
7  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we investigate regional banking system fragility and explore contagion 
within and across regions. We measure regional banking system fragility through the number of 
joint occurrences of extreme negative returns in banking system indices. We find that regional 
banking system fragility reduces when banks in the region jointly hold more liquid assets, are 
better capitalized, and for more competitive regional banking systems. For Asia and Latin-
America, a greater presence of foreign banks also reduces regional banking system fragility. We 
further investigate the possibility of contagion within and across regions. Within region banking 
contagion is important in all regions but it is substantially lower in the developed regions 
compared to emerging market regions. For cross-regional contagion, we find that the contagion 
effects of Europe and the US on Asia and Latin America are significantly higher compared to the 
effect of Asia and Latin America among themselves. Finally, the impact of cross-regional 
contagion is attenuated when the host region has a more liquid or better capitalized banking 
sector.  
All in all our paper shows that regional banking system characteristics such as higher 
liquidity and capital help in attenuating regional banking system fragility and reduce the impact 
of cross-regional contagion. Therefore, national supervisors should not only take into account 
their own banking system’s characteristics but the banking system characteristics of the entire 
region. 
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when >=4 > = 4 3210 0123 > = 4
Mean return 
when >=4
CHN ‐4.69% 19 17 41 113 2497 2451 121 45 17 7 7.32%
KOR ‐7.40% 28 34 54 74 2497 2451 78 61 27 24 7.42%
PHL ‐4.16% 33 31 54 72 2497 2451 89 57 21 23 3.35%
TWN ‐4.66% 30 26 42 92 2497 2451 109 47 16 18 5.52%
INA ‐5.74% 25 22 53 90 2497 2451 97 56 23 14 6.83%
IND ‐7.77% 29 22 52 87 2497 2451 84 57 26 23 10.07%
MAL ‐4.21% 35 41 55 59 2497 2451 74 59 28 29 5.29%
PAK ‐7.18% 11 18 38 123 2497 2451 100 58 20 12 5.43%
SRI ‐3.87% 12 8 43 127 2497 2451 115 55 14 6 3.70%
THA ‐6.06% 38 33 48 71 2497 2451 76 57 27 30 8.58%
Total ‐5.57% 55 84 240 908 2497 2451 943 276 73 41 6.35%
ARG ‐7.07% 33 29 41 87 2832 2744 102 55 16 17 8.39%
BRA ‐4.91% 33 30 48 79 2832 2744 97 56 19 18 6.25%
CHI ‐3.34% 25 17 39 109 2832 2744 103 55 16 16 4.30%
COL ‐4.00% 19 17 41 113 2832 2744 136 39 7 8 4.03%
MEX ‐6.28% 32 23 44 91 2832 2744 121 38 17 14 6.87%
PER ‐3.66% 24 15 39 112 2832 2744 122 41 13 14 3.74%
VEN ‐4.67% 11 13 38 128 2832 2744 148 34 5 3 3.94%
Total ‐4.85% 40 48 145 719 2832 2744 829 159 31 21 5.36%
Number of Negative Coexceedances Number of Positive Coexceedances
We define an extreme event when the banking indexreturn on that day lies below the 5th percentile of daily return distribution and referto
this as an exceedance of the return on the banking index. The distribution of the daily banking indexreturn is directly observed fromour
dataset (3784 daily observations from July 01, 1994 to December 31, 2008). From the distribution of 3784 daily observations of return on
banking indices, we calculate 5
th percentile value for each country and region and then use this value as a standard to decide whether a
country or region on a particular day exceed or not. The lowest 5% observations correspond to negative exceedance and highest 5% are
labeled as positive exceedances.Moreover,we say coexceedances when the banking indices ofmore than 1 country in the region exceed on
the same day (i.e. joint occurrences of extreme returns). In this table we report the number of days for 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 or more joint
occurrences ofextreme return (coexceedances) within a region on a particular day.A 0exceedance means no country exceed on a given day
and we observed 2497 such days in Asia and 2832 days in Latin America. Similarly, any number (1, 2, ... n; where n is the total number of
countries in that region) of coexceedances can be observed on a given day. We have stratified the number of coexceedances into four
groups (1,2,3,>=4).At the bottomofeach block,the total numberof days is reported for each number ofcoexceedance. Forexample, out of
3784 trading days we have observed 908 days when only 1 country negatively exceed in Asia. Similarly, we find 240 days when two countries 
coexceed (negative) and 55 days when 4 or more countries coexceed in Asia. Within each region,we also mentioned howoften a particular
country exceed.Forinstance,we find that China is the only country on 113days out of908 days when 1country has lowest extreme returns.
Similarly,there are 19days out of55days when China is among those 4ormore countries coexceed.The first (last) column give mean returns
when 4ormore countries have negative (positive)coexceedance. The bottomrow 'Total'provide mean return irrespective of which countries
are included, whereas numbers associated with country are mean return of that particular country when it is among those 4 or more countries. 
forexample,in Asia,the average daily return ofall countries in those 55 days is -5.57percent. Whereas,the average daily return for china in




%M e a n S t d  Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
CHN 29.289 13.844 ‐0.0060 0.056 4.345 3.093
KOR 33.741 18.996 0.0163 0.959 7.619 3.678
PHL 21.974 6.977 0.0166 0.561 10.370 3.820
TWN 24.230 6.969 0.0058 0.304 3.938 2.075
INA 23.034 8.617 0.0120 0.283 8.392 2.630
IND 26.331 11.182 0.0112 0.876 13.361 7.504
MAL 18.157 12.171 0.0108 0.659 4.785 2.225
PAK 26.635 9.733 0.0258 0.436 9.600 3.909
SRI 17.617 20.879 0.0223 0.257 13.319 3.721
THA 27.627 9.358 0.0116 0.606 9.191 3.145
Asia 21.188 9.949 0.0135 0.226 8.492 2.838
ARG 24.744 8.816 0.0431 1.667 21.488 22.034
BRA 24.047 10.137 0.0320 0.935 1.072 0.770
CHI 12.544 4.960 0.0145 0.807 0.498 0.210
COL 14.418 7.278 0.0282 0.568 16.399 10.325
MEX 19.380 7.427 0.0422 0.974 16.485 10.714
PER 18.431 6.591 0.0101 0.337 12.793 2.934
VEN 38.986 19.974 0.0802 1.869 17.529 9.145
Latin America 23.389 10.842 0.0356 0.458 12.140 4.863
United States 15.841 7.910 ‐0.0003 0.443 4.131 1.722
Europe 15.030 7.665 ‐0.0002 0.544 4.431 1.476
Conditional Volatility Exchange Rate Changes Interest Rate Level
We estimate conditionalvolatility ofindividual countries through theirrespective totalmarket stockindices.
Whereas, regional stock market volatility is estimated through International Finance Corporation (IFC)
indices from Asia and Latin America, and the S&P 500 index for the United States and Datastream
International Europe Index for Europe. For each region, we estimate the conditional volatility of the
respective stock indices using a GARCH (1, 1) model with maximum likelihood method. In first column, we
report mean and standard deviation of conditional volatility of all countries as well as region. Similarly,We
calculate the daily change in exchange rate against US dollarfor each country in Asia and Latin America.In
case of the US, we use a basket of four currencies (i.e. GBP, JPY, CHF and EUR) to evaluate exchange rate
changes. For Europe, since EUR and GBP are the two major currencies, we take equal-weighted average of
EUR and GBP exchange rates changes against USD. Since our sample starts from June 1994; therefore, we
use country-weighted average of exchange rate against USDof euro currencies fordaily observations prior
to the introduction of EUR. Second column represents mean and standard deviation of daily percentage
change in exchange rate for each country. For regional values, we take equal-weighted average of daily
changes in exchange rate of all countries in the region. Lastly, third column shows mean and standard
deviation ofannualinterest rates in each country and regionalinterest rate is the equal-weighted average of





Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
CHN 0.021 0.022 0.035 0.012 0.800 0.083 0.538 0.092 0.098 0.027
KOR 0.054 0.010 0.051 0.011 0.464 0.064 0.584 0.034 0.116 0.098
PHL 0.037 0.015 0.118 0.011 0.597 0.049 0.432 0.065 0.142 0.015
TWN 0.022 0.005 0.077 0.010 0.490 0.110 0.492 0.049 N/A N/A
INA 0.125 0.019 0.065 0.006 0.495 0.062 0.480 0.080 0.086 0.016
IND 0.050 0.022 0.079 0.092 0.693 0.096 0.536 0.132 0.327 0.058
MAL 0.022 0.014 0.088 0.015 0.442 0.063 0.601 0.035 0.283 0.029
PAK 0.116 0.025 0.062 0.040 0.789 0.138 0.475 0.077 0.150 0.088
SRI 0.017 0.006 0.077 0.025 0.825 0.118 0.532 0.041 0.000 0.000
THA 0.024 0.004 0.065 0.022 0.603 0.065 0.637 0.050 0.127 0.036
Asia 0.028 0.009 0.053 0.003 0.625 0.043 0.540 0.052 0.148 0.032
ARG 0.025 0.010 0.111 0.013 0.593 0.075 0.469 0.147 0.328 0.047
BRA 0.015 0.004 0.078 0.007 0.545 0.073 0.355 0.032 0.329 0.042
CHI 0.058 0.016 0.047 0.013 0.746 0.076 0.617 0.074 0.464 0.040
COL 0.033 0.013 0.201 0.046 0.571 0.085 0.576 0.131 0.263 0.029
MEX 0.039 0.023 0.087 0.024 0.648 0.133 0.629 0.083 0.467 0.066
PER 0.080 0.114 0.073 0.014 0.807 0.047 0.472 0.066 0.536 0.098
VEN 0.106 0.030 0.158 0.060 0.758 0.085 0.362 0.134 0.223 0.051
Latin America 0.029 0.005 0.087 0.009 0.593 0.053 0.444 0.031 0.373 0.042
United States 0.028 0.007 0.070 0.004 0.146 0.010 0.508 0.031 0.199 0.038
Europe 0.018 0.002 0.047 0.002 0.093 0.009 0.500 0.024 0.335 0.038
Foreign Banks
The table report mean and standard deviation of banking system characteristics during the sample period for each country fromJuly 01, 1994 to December 31, 2010.
Liquidity is the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets of the banking system. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity (that includes common shares and
premium; retained earnings; reserves for general banking risks and statutory reserves; loss absorbing minority interests; net revaluation of AFSsecurities; FXreserves
included in equity and revaluations other than securities deemed to be equity capital) to total assets ofthe banking system. Concentration is the ratio oftotal assets of
biggest five banks to totalassets ofall banks (i.e. C5measure) foreach country in the region. Finally,loan ratio is calculated as net loans to total earning assets foreach
country. Regional variables for Asia and Latin America are obtained by weighted-average of individual country using total assets of banking system as weights. Whereas, 
the US is a single country case and for Europe we include all active banks that are covered in the Datastream.
Banking System 
Characteristics




Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob
Base Case 0 2497 0.660 2832 0.748
Constant 1 908 0.240 ‐2.422
a 719 0.190 ‐2.350
a
2 240 0.063 ‐5.758
a 145 0.038 ‐5.472
a
38 4 0 . 0 2 2 ‐6.943
a 48 0.013 ‐6.962
a
>=4 55 0.015 ‐8.594





20 . 0 6 6
a 0.003 0.054
a 0.001









21 . 4 2 0
a 0.061 0.533
a 0.013









20 . 2 1 7
a 0.010 0.075
a 0.002









Base Case 0 3594 0.950 3594 0.950
Constant 1 190 0.050 ‐4.6121













First column shows the number of coexceedances and relative frequency in our data sample for each region. We use the number of
coexceedances of daily returns as dependent variable in multinomiallogistics modelfor Asia and Latin America with five categories for
numberofcoexceedances I.e.0,1,2,3,and >=4on a given day. In case ofthe USand Europe,we use binomial logistic model with binary
dependent variable of whether exceedance or not on a given day. 
a, b, and 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob
Contagion Triggers from Asia 10 . 1 8 6
a 0.026
20 . 4 1 7
a 0.009




Contagion Triggers from Latin America 1 0.041 0.004
2 0.122 0.005




Contagion Triggers from the US 10 . 6 4 2
a 0.095 0.653
a 0.086
21 . 1 7 4
a 0.065 1.555
a 0.059






Contagion Triggers from Europe 1 ‐0.011 ‐0.025 0.636
a 0.093
20 . 6 5 5
b 0.036 1.206
a 0.038









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Clustering of Negative Extreme Events in the Sample Period  
We measure the frequency of coexceedances in calendar year in our sample period. Upper graph 
reports the frequency of 2 coexceedances (i.e. how frequent are 2 countries have negative extreme 
returns on banking indices on the same day). Lower graph shows the joint occurrences more 
extreme shocks when 4 or more countries have negative extreme returns on banking indices on the 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Latin America: Loan Ratio
































































































































































































































































































































































Latin America: Foreign Banks
P=0 P=1 P=2 P=3 P=4 or more
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Predicted Probability that y = 1
Correct interaction effect Incorrect marginal effect
















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Predicted Probability that y = 1












































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Predicted Probability that y = 1
Correct interaction effect Incorrect marginal effect
















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Predicted Probability that y = 1











































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Predicted Probability that y = 1
Correct interaction effect Incorrect marginal effect
















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Predicted Probability that y = 1
Liquidity in Europe and Contagion from Latin America
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Capitalization in Europe and Contagion from Asia
     
Figure 3 (cont’d): Interaction Effect of Cross-Regional Contagion and Capitalization in the Host Region 
These graphs show the values of the interaction term for all data points using Ai and Norton (2003). The continuous concave line is the 
marginal effect of the interaction term computed by the standard procedure; whereas the dots show the correct interaction effect. The 
statistical significance of the interaction effect is shown in the adjacent graph. The interaction effect is statistically significant whenever the 
z‐value lies above or below the confidence interval lines. 